Philosophy of Mind and Cognition An Introduction,9781405133241

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition An Introduction

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Edition: 2nd
ISBN13: 9781405133241
ISBN10: 1405133244
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2006-11-17
Publisher(s): Wiley-Blackwell
List Price: $50.08

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Summary

David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson's popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes' famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view that psychology is autonomous; fuller discussion of recent debates over phenomenal experience; and much more.

Author Biography

David Braddon-Mitchell is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

Frank Jackson is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. He is the author of Conditionals (Blackwell, 1987) and his John Locke Lectures were published as From Metaphysics to Ethics in 1998.

Table of Contents

Preface x
Part I: From Dualism to Common-sense Functionalism 1(64)
1 The Flight from Dualism
3(34)
The Issue Between Dualism and Materialism
3(18)
Some of the classic arguments for dualism
4(6)
Two kinds of dualism
10(2)
The causal problem for dualism
12(3)
Some responses for the dualist
15(4)
Refining the definition of materialism
19(2)
Supervenience
21(2)
Supervenience and completeness
21(2)
Supervenience and possible worlds
23(1)
Possible Worlds: An Introduction
23(12)
Explications in terms of possible worlds
24(4)
Supervenience and possible worlds
28(1)
Materialism and supervenience
28(2)
Making true and the varieties of materialism
30(1)
Some warnings and physical properties revisited
31(4)
Annotated Reading
35(2)
2 Behaviourism and Beyond
37(11)
The Case for Behaviourism
38(2)
Methodological and Revisionary Behaviourism
40(1)
Problems for Behaviourism
41(4)
The Path to Functionalism via a Causal Theory
45(1)
The Causal Theory of Mind
46(1)
Annotated Reading
47(1)
3 Common-sense Functionalism
48(17)
Multiple Realizability
49(3)
Common-sense Functionalism Expounded
52(3)
Interconnections without Circularity
55(4)
Behaviour Characterized in Terms of Environmental Impact
59(2)
What Does Common Sense Say about the Mind?
61(3)
Annotated Reading
64(1)
Part II: Rivals and Objections 65(104)
4 Theory of Reference
67(17)
The Description Theory of Reference
67(5)
Objections to the description theory
69(3)
The Causal Theory
72(7)
Rigid designation
75(4)
The Necessary A Posteriori
79(4)
Annotated Reading
83(1)
5 Empirical Functionalisms
84(11)
Common-sense Functional Roles as a Reference-fixing Device
84(3)
Chauvinism and Empirical Functionalism
87(7)
Annotated Reading
94(1)
6 The Identity Theory
95(12)
The Identity Theory and Functionalism
97(1)
Some Early Objections to the Identity Theory
98(2)
Token–Token versus Type–Type Identity Theories
100(4)
Essentialism about Psychological States
104(2)
Annotated Reading
106(1)
7 Four Challenges to Functionalism
107(22)
The China Brain
107(3)
The Chinese Room
110(4)
Blockhead
114(1)
Good chess versus being good at chess
115(1)
The game of life
116(3)
Why Blockhead is not a thinker
119(3)
Common-sense functionalism and Blockhead
122(1)
The Zombie Objection
123(5)
Annotated Reading
128(1)
8 Phenomenal Qualities and Consciousness
129(25)
The Question of Qualia
130(12)
The spectrum inversion objection to functionalism
131(3)
The knowledge argument challenge to physicalism
134(1)
Replies to the knowledge argument
135(7)
Consciousness
142(7)
Representationalism and Perceptual Experience
149(3)
Annotated Reading
152(2)
9 Instrumentalism and Interpretationism
154(15)
Instrumentalism
154(10)
Stances and intentional systems
155(4)
Instrumentalism and intentional systems theory
159(5)
Interpretationism
164(3)
Annotated Reading
167(2)
Part III: About Content 169(94)
10 The Language of Thought
171(14)
The Language of Thought Hypothesis
173(4)
Why are we supposed to believe in the language of thought?
175(2)
The Map Alternative
177(7)
The way maps represent
179(2)
Do maps explain the phenomena?
181(3)
Annotated Reading
184(1)
11 Content
185(34)
What is the Problem of Content?
185(3)
The Map Theory
188(5)
Belief as a map by which we steer
188(5)
The Internal Sentence Theory
193(2)
Problems for the Map-system Theory
195(8)
Problems and Questions for the Internal Sentence Theory
203(14)
Informational semantics
204(6)
Content, evolution and biological function
210(5)
A general objection to the internal sentence theory of the content of belief
215(2)
Annotated Reading
217(2)
12 Connectionism
219(18)
Connectionism and the Map-system Theory
230(6)
Annotated Reading
236(1)
13 Broad and Narrow Content
237(26)
Narrow Content
238(8)
Virtual reality and brains in vats
238(2)
Narrow content is not intrinsic
240(2)
Egocentric content
242(3)
The explanatory value of narrow content
245(1)
Broad Content
246(8)
The explanatory value of broad content
251(3)
Deflationism about Broad Content versus Scepticism about Narrow Content
254(7)
Annotated Reading
261(2)
Part IV: Explaining Behaviour: Eliminativism and Realism 263(29)
14 Eliminative Materialism
265(15)
The Case for Eliminativism
265(3)
The Functionalist Reply to Eliminativism
268(7)
Does functionalism make it too easy to save folk psychology?
272(2)
Empirical functionalism: how to have strong internal constraints without inviting scepticism
274(1)
Natural Kinds and Scientific Reductions
275(4)
Annotated Reading
279(1)
15 Psychological Explanation and Common-sense Functionalism
280(12)
Three Questions for Common-sense Functionalism
281(10)
The triviality question
282(2)
The relationship question: partial and complete explanations
284(5)
The causal question
289(2)
Annotated Reading
291(1)
Glossary 292(18)
Bibliography 310(6)
Index 316

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