Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity,9780631192114

Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity

by ;
Edition: 1st
ISBN13: 9780631192114
ISBN10: 0631192115
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 1996-01-09
Publisher(s): Wiley-Blackwell
List Price: $61.81

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Summary

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.

Author Biography

Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973), The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View (1986).

Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).

Table of Contents

Preface viii
Part I Moral Relativism 1(64)
Gilbert Harman
1 Moral Relativism
3(17)
2 Social Contracts
20(12)
3 Expressing Basic Disagreement
32(13)
4 Universality of Practical Reasons?
45(12)
5 Judgments about Outsiders
57(8)
Part II Moral Objectivity 65(90)
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Introduction to Part II 67(2)
6 Epistemological Arguments for Moral Scepticism
69(26)
7 Emotivism
95(30)
8 Evaluatives and Directives
125(30)
Part III Responses 155(63)
9 Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II
157(31)
10 Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I
188(30)
Bibliography 218(6)
Index 224

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