| Preface |
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xi | |
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1 | (10) |
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1 | (3) |
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An outline of the history of game theory |
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2 | (1) |
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3 | (1) |
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The theory of rational choice |
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4 | (3) |
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Coming attractions: interacting decision-makers |
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7 | (4) |
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9 | (2) |
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I Games with Perfect Information |
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11 | (260) |
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13 | (42) |
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13 | (1) |
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Example: the Prisoner's Dilemma |
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14 | (4) |
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Example: Bach or Stravinsky? |
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18 | (1) |
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Example: Matching Pennies |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (5) |
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23 | (1) |
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Studying Nash equilibrium experimentally |
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24 | (2) |
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Examples of Nash equilibrium |
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26 | (9) |
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Experimental evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma |
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28 | (4) |
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32 | (3) |
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35 | (10) |
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45 | (5) |
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Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric equilibria |
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50 | (5) |
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53 | (2) |
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Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations |
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55 | (44) |
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Cournot's model of oligopoly |
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55 | (8) |
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Bertrand's model of oligopoly |
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63 | (7) |
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Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: some historical notes |
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69 | (1) |
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70 | (7) |
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77 | (3) |
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80 | (11) |
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Auctions from Babylonia to eBay |
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81 | (10) |
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91 | (8) |
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97 | (2) |
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Mixed Strategy Equilibrium |
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99 | (54) |
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99 | (7) |
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Some evidence on expected payoff functions |
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104 | (2) |
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Strategic games in which players may randomize |
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106 | (1) |
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Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium |
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107 | (13) |
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120 | (2) |
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Pure equilibria when randomization is allowed |
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122 | (1) |
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Illustration: expert diagnosis |
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123 | (5) |
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Equilibrium in a single population |
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128 | (3) |
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Illustration: reporting a crime |
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131 | (3) |
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Reporting a crime: social psychology and game theory |
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133 | (1) |
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The formation of players' beliefs |
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134 | (3) |
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Extension: finding all mixed strategy Nash equilibria |
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137 | (5) |
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Extension: games in which each player has a continuum of actions |
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142 | (4) |
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Appendix: representing preferences by expected payoffs |
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146 | (7) |
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150 | (3) |
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Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory |
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153 | (28) |
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Extensive games with perfect information |
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153 | (6) |
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159 | (2) |
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161 | (3) |
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Subgame perfect equilibrium |
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164 | (5) |
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Finding subgame perfect equilibria of finite horizon games: backward induction |
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169 | (12) |
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Ticktacktoe, chess, and related games |
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178 | (1) |
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179 | (2) |
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Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Illustrations |
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181 | (24) |
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The ultimatum game, the holdup game, and agenda control |
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181 | (6) |
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Experiments on the ultimatum game |
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183 | (4) |
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Stackelberg's model of duopoly |
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187 | (5) |
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192 | (5) |
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197 | (8) |
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203 | (2) |
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Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion |
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205 | (34) |
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Allowing for simultaneous moves |
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205 | (8) |
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More experimental evidence on subgame perfect equilibrium |
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211 | (2) |
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Illustration: entry into a monopolized industry |
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213 | (2) |
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Illustration: electoral competition with strategic voters |
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215 | (2) |
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Illustration: committee decision-making |
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217 | (4) |
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Illustration: exit from a declining industry |
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221 | (4) |
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Allowing for exogenous uncertainty |
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225 | (6) |
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Discussion: subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction |
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231 | (5) |
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Experimental evidence on the centipede game |
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234 | (2) |
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236 | (3) |
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Coalitional Games and the Core |
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239 | (32) |
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239 | (4) |
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243 | (4) |
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Illustration: ownership and the distribution of wealth |
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247 | (4) |
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Illustration: exchanging homogeneous horses |
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251 | (5) |
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Illustration: exchanging heterogeneous houses |
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256 | (4) |
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260 | (3) |
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263 | (6) |
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Matching doctors with hospitals |
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268 | (1) |
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Discussion: other solution concepts |
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269 | (2) |
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270 | (1) |
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II Games with Imperfect Information |
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271 | (88) |
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273 | (40) |
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273 | (5) |
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278 | (4) |
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Two examples concerning information |
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282 | (3) |
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Illustration: Cournot's duopoly game with imperfect information |
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285 | (4) |
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Illustration: providing a public good |
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289 | (2) |
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291 | (10) |
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Auctions of the radio spectrum |
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300 | (1) |
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301 | (6) |
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Appendix: auctions with an arbitrary distribution of valuations |
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307 | (6) |
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311 | (2) |
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Extensive Games with Imperfect Information |
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313 | (46) |
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Extensive games with imperfect information |
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313 | (4) |
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317 | (1) |
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318 | (5) |
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Beliefs and sequential equilibrium |
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323 | (8) |
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331 | (5) |
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Illustration: conspicuous expenditure as a signal of quality |
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336 | (4) |
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Illustration: education as a signal of ability |
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340 | (3) |
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Illustration: strategic information transmission |
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343 | (8) |
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Illustration: agenda control with imperfect information |
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351 | (8) |
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357 | (2) |
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III Variants and Extensions |
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359 | (148) |
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Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization |
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361 | (16) |
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361 | (3) |
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Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium |
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364 | (1) |
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Strictly competitive games |
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365 | (2) |
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Maxminimization and Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games |
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367 | (10) |
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Maxminimization: some history |
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370 | (3) |
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Empirical tests: experiments, tennis, and soccer |
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373 | (2) |
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375 | (2) |
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377 | (16) |
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377 | (8) |
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Iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions |
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385 | (3) |
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Iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions |
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388 | (3) |
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391 | (2) |
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392 | (1) |
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393 | (26) |
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Monomorphic pure strategy equilibrium |
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394 | (6) |
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Evolutionary game theory: some history |
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399 | (1) |
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Mixed strategies and polymorphic equilibrium |
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400 | (6) |
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406 | (5) |
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407 | (2) |
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Explaining the outcomes of contests in nature |
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409 | (2) |
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Variation on a theme: sibling behavior |
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411 | (3) |
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Variation on a theme: the nesting behavior of wasps |
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414 | (2) |
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Variation on a theme: the evolution of the sex ratio |
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416 | (3) |
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417 | (2) |
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Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma |
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419 | (32) |
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419 | (2) |
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421 | (2) |
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423 | (1) |
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Finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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424 | (2) |
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Infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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426 | (1) |
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Strategies in an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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426 | (2) |
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Some Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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428 | (3) |
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Nash equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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431 | (6) |
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436 | (1) |
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Subgame perfect equilibria and the one-deviation property |
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437 | (4) |
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439 | (2) |
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Some subgame perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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441 | (5) |
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Reciprocal altruism among sticklebacks |
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445 | (1) |
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Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma |
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446 | (3) |
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448 | (1) |
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449 | (2) |
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449 | (2) |
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Repeated Games: General Results |
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451 | (14) |
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Nash equilibria of general infinitely repeated games |
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451 | (4) |
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Subgame perfect equilibria of general infinitely repeated games |
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455 | (5) |
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460 | (1) |
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Variation on a theme: imperfect observability |
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461 | (4) |
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463 | (2) |
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465 | (28) |
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Bargaining as an extensive game |
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465 | (12) |
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Illustration: trade in a market |
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477 | (4) |
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481 | (8) |
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Relation between strategic and axiomatic models |
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489 | (4) |
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491 | (2) |
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493 | (14) |
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493 | (1) |
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494 | (1) |
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495 | (3) |
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498 | (1) |
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499 | (1) |
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499 | (6) |
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505 | (2) |
| References |
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507 | (18) |
| Index |
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525 | |
Other versions by this Author