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viii | |
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ix | |
| Preface |
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xi | |
| Series Editor's Preface |
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xvii | |
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1 | (20) |
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TVE Sector and Its Role in China's Economic Growth |
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2 | (5) |
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TVEs' Organization and the Focus of the Research |
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7 | (7) |
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The Sources and the Methodology |
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14 | (4) |
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The Organization of the Book |
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18 | (3) |
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Local Government Leaders, Firm Managers, and the Two-tier Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs |
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21 | (61) |
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The Dual Role of Local Leaders in Rural Organization |
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24 | (4) |
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The Objectives and Incentives of Local Leaders |
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28 | (14) |
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28 | (4) |
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32 | (10) |
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The Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs |
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42 | (12) |
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43 | (3) |
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The Property Rights Structure in Socialist Public Enterprises |
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46 | (2) |
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The Property Rights of Collective TVEs |
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48 | (6) |
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The Advantage of Local Leaders as de facto Owner of Collective TVEs |
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54 | (21) |
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54 | (3) |
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57 | (13) |
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Uncertainty and Risk Absorption |
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70 | (5) |
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TVE Managers as the Agents of Local Community Government |
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75 | (7) |
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The Re-delegation of the Control Rights from Community Government to firm Managers |
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76 | (1) |
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The Constitution of TVE Managers |
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77 | (3) |
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The Governance of Collective TVEs |
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80 | (2) |
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The Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs |
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82 | (38) |
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The Contractual Forms Implemented in Collective TVEs |
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83 | (19) |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (3) |
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The Collective Contractual Responsibility System |
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88 | (3) |
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The Personal Contractual Responsibility System |
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91 | (6) |
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97 | (2) |
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99 | (3) |
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The Share-cooperative System |
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102 | (5) |
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Three Categories of the Managerial Contractual Forms |
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107 | (6) |
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The Coexistence, Evolution, and Cross-regional Variation in the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs |
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113 | (7) |
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Modeling the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs |
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120 | (51) |
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Institutions and Induced Institutional Innovation: A Brief Review of Institutional Economics |
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120 | (18) |
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Institutions and Institutional Economics |
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121 | (3) |
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Institutions of Governance |
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124 | (3) |
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Contracting with Positive Transaction Costs |
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127 | (2) |
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Governance Structure and Transaction Costs |
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129 | (3) |
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Induced Institutional Innovation |
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132 | (6) |
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What Factors May Determine the Contractual Form of TVEs? |
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138 | (13) |
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151 | (5) |
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Model Simulations and Implications |
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156 | (15) |
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The Space Partition of Dominant Contractual Form |
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159 | (4) |
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The Divergence in Firm's Technical Structure |
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163 | (2) |
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Changes in the Relative Importance of External Management |
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165 | (3) |
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Changes in Opportunity Incomes |
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168 | (3) |
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Explaining the Contractual Form Innovation in Collective TVEs |
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171 | (37) |
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Empirical Tests of the Model: The Explanatory Power of Model Predicted Factors |
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171 | (16) |
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The Development of Markets |
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172 | (4) |
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The Technical Structure of the Firm |
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176 | (8) |
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The Economic Setting of the Locality |
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184 | (3) |
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Empirical Tests of the Model: The Relative Importance of Model Predicted Factors |
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187 | (21) |
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The Model and the Variables |
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187 | (6) |
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193 | (3) |
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The Results and the Explanations |
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196 | (9) |
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205 | (3) |
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Endogenous Reform and Induced Privatization: Concluding Remarks |
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208 | (38) |
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208 | (4) |
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The Endogenous Model of Economic Reform: `Induced Privatization' |
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212 | (7) |
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The Feedback Effects of Contractual Form Innovation |
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219 | (13) |
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232 | (7) |
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239 | (7) |
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Diffusion of Fixed-payment Contractual Form |
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239 | (3) |
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Stagnation in the Zhejiang Investigation Site |
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242 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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Persistence of the Fixed-wage Managerial Form |
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243 | (1) |
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244 | (2) |
| Bibliography |
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246 | (20) |
| Index |
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266 | |
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