The Financial Crisis of Our Time

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Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2011-01-28
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
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Summary

The Financial Crisis of Our Time investigates the mechanism by which the housing industry came into crisis beginning in 2006. It does not claim this to be the cause of the recent financial crisis-it argues that no single such cause can be identified. It posits that the events leading up to the recent crisis cannot be understood without first comprehending what happened in the housing industry, as residential real estate prices fell, threatened the world's largest and most respected financial institutions beginning in 2007 and confronted the real economy with serious problems and even disaster in 2008. The book begins by analyzing how the housing finance system developed in 1990 into a finance model that confronted market participants with an array of new incentives. Borrowers, mortgage brokers, appraisers, loan originators, securitizers, due diligence firms, rating agencies, ultimate investors, legislators, and bureaucrats all fit together to form an intricate mechanism-a "clockwork of perverse incentives." The dangerous feature of this system was that by simply responding to the incentives before them and acting out of self-interest, the various participants were contributing into an elaborate mechanism that led to disaster. Unlike a clock, there was no overall architect or designer for the system of housing finance. It evolved from individuals' responses to legal incentives and market forces. Only by understanding the incentives in the originate-to-distribute mortgage cycle can we understand the actors' behavior and ultimate effect.

Author Biography


Robert W. Kolb is Professor of Finance and Frank W. Considine Chair of Applied Ethics at Loyola University Chicago. He has been professor of finance at the University of Florida, Emory University, the University of Miami, and the University of Colorado, and has published more than 20 books, including Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future and Futures, Options, and Swaps.

Table of Contents

Prefacep. ix
Abbreviationsp. xxi
Introduction: The Financial Crisis of Our Timep. 1
Before the Great Depressionp. 2
From the Great Depression to Financial Deregulationp. 4
From Financial Deregulation to the Savings and Loan Crisisp. 10
From Securitization to Subprimep. 16
The Development of Securitizationp. 16
The Process of Securitization: An Overviewp. 26
Credit Enhancementp. 33
The Subprime Differencep. 35
Before the Delugep. 38
Subprime Lending: To the Peakp. 38
The Height of Subprime Lendingp. 46
From the Subprime Crisis to Financial Disaster: An Overviewp. 57
The Housing Peak to Hints of Something Wrongp. 57
The Slide Acceleratesp. 59
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Foreclosuresp. 61
No Relief in 2008p. 63
The Climax?p. 67
Back from the Brinkp. 72
Extinctionsp. 74
Among the Ruinsp. 74
From Countrywide to IndyMacp. 75
IndyMacp. 77
Washington Mutualp. 80
Wachoviap. 82
Bank Extinctions, Banking Consolidation, and Too-Big-to-Failp. 84
The End of Investment Bankingp. 87
Big Brains, Big Egos, and Big Payp. 87
Bear Stearnsp. 88
The Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothersp. 96
Merrill Lynch: The Herd Goes to the Abattoirp. 98
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and the Week That Remade Wall Streetp. 102
When Zombies Walk the Earthp. 109
Fannie Mae and Freddie Macp. 110
AIGp. 117
Citigroup: The Biggest Zombie of Them Allp. 124
Zombies and the Futurep. 126
Policy Responses and the Beginnings of Recoveryp. 128
Unfurling the TARPp. 129
The Market Reactsp. 131
The TARP Evolvesp. 133
Introduction of the TALFp. 136
Instituting More Programsp. 138
Support for the Auto Industryp. 138
Support for Home Ownersp. 139
Green Shoots in the Financial Sectorp. 139
Initial Cost Assessmentp. 140
Causes of the Financial Crisis: Macroeconomic Developments and Federal Policyp. 143
The Basic Storyp. 144
Macroeconomic Developmentsp. 146
Federal Stimulative Policy and Legislationp. 148
Attempts to Combat Mortgage Lending Discrimination and to Expand Home Ownership to Minoritiesp. 149
National Homeownership Strategyp. 151
The Causal Role of the GSEsp. 155
Causes of the Financial Crisis: The Failure of Prudential Regulationp. 160
Regulation of Depository Institutionsp. 162
Regulation of Lines of Businessp. 162
Capital Requirementsp. 163
Interaction Between Capital Regulation and Credit Derivativesp. 166
Regulation of Size and Scope-"Too Big to Fail"p. 167
Restrictions on Concentration of Riskp. 169
Regulation of Securities Markets and Supporting Institutionsp. 170
Capital Regulationsp. 170
Off-Balance Sheet Corporate Entitiesp. 173
Credit-Rating Agenciesp. 174
Mark-to-Market Accounting Rulesp. 178
Complex Financial Derivativesp. 181
The Regulation of AIGp. 181
Poor Regulation of Mortgage Industryp. 183
Emergency Responses to the Crisis and "Really Too Big to Fail"p. 184
Defects in Regulatory Architecturep. 186
Causes of the Financial Crisis: From Aspiring Home Owner to Mortgage Lenderp. 187
The Borrowerp. 190
The Lenderp. 191
The Appraiserp. 195
The Mortgage Brokerp. 197
The Mortgage Frenzy, the Originator, and Underwriting Standardsp. 203
Causes of the Financial Crisis: From Securitizer to Ultimate Investorp. 208
Creating Securities and Obtaining Ratingsp. 211
To the Ultimate Investorp. 221
Incentives from Securitizers to Ultimate Investorsp. 224
Causes of the Financial Crisis: Financial Innovation, Poor Risk Management, and Excessive Leveragep. 226
Financial Innovation and the Creation of Complex Instrumentsp. 227
Poor Risk managementp. 232
Excessive Leveragep. 236
Causes of the Financial Crisis: Executive Compensation and Poor Corporate Governancep. 239
Pay at Financial Firmsp. 241
Risk-Taking and Executive Compensation in the Financial Crisisp. 249
Incentives, Risk-Taking, and Compensation at Fannie Maep. 250
Executive Compensation at Lehman Brothersp. 253
Incentive Conflictsp. 256
Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisisp. 257
Consequences of the Financial Crisis and the Future It Leaves Usp. 260
Measuring the Damage: A Warningp. 260
The Bailout and Its Costsp. 261
From 2006 to 2009: Our Economic World and How It Has Changedp. 266
Reduced Circumstances: Our Economic Futurep. 268
Beyond the Merely Economic-American Recessional or American Renewal?p. 272
Perfecting the Fatally Flawed Regulatory Regimes of the Pastp. 275
The Financial Crisis, the Great Recession, and Institutional Failuresp. 277
Fundamental Reform?p. 281
"Too Big to Fail"p. 282
Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, and Firms' Risk-Takingp. 284
Conclusion: Dopes, Genius, Saints, Scoundrels, and Ordinary Peoplep. 286
Glossaryp. 289
Timeline of the Subprime Financial Crisisp. 301
The Original TARP Proposal: Legislative Proposal for Treasury Authority To Purchase Mortgage-Related Assetsp. 317
Notesp. 321
Referencesp. 357
Indexp. 379
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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