| Preface |
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ix | |
| List of Abbreviations |
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xi | |
| 1 Introduction |
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1 | (20) |
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1.1 The Auckland Blackout |
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1 | (2) |
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1.2 Studying Infrastructural Failures: A Crisis Management Approach |
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3 | (3) |
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1.3 Urban Crisis Management |
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6 | (4) |
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6 | (1) |
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6 | (1) |
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1.3.3 Urban Cultural Geography and Sociology |
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6 | (1) |
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1.3.4 Crisis Management in Urban Areas |
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7 | (3) |
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1.4 Contextual Process Analysis |
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10 | (4) |
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14 | (5) |
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19 | (2) |
| 2 Public Sector Reform, Electricity Policy, and Crisis Preparedness in New Zealand |
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21 | (30) |
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2.1 A Country in Transition |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (2) |
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24 | (6) |
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2.4 Local Government Reform |
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30 | (3) |
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2.5 Civil Defense and Disaster Planning |
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33 | (8) |
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2.6 The Auckland Region and its Infrastructure Policy: Key Actors |
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41 | (10) |
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2.6.1 Electricity Provision in Auckland: the Creation of Mercury Energy |
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43 | (3) |
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2.6.2 The Lifelines Project |
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46 | (5) |
| 3 The Power Outage Crisis: Key Events and Critical Decisions |
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51 | (56) |
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51 | (4) |
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3.2 Critical Decisions and Opportunities |
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55 | (52) |
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3.2.1 The First Cable Fails |
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55 | (1) |
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3.2.2 The Second Cable Fails |
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56 | (4) |
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3.2.3 The Third Cable Fails |
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60 | (2) |
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3.2.4 The Unthinkable Happens |
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62 | (2) |
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3.2.5 Acute Operational Changes |
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64 | (8) |
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3.2.6 Developing a Crisis Response Strategy |
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72 | (4) |
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3.2.7 To Declare or Not to Declare |
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76 | (5) |
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81 | (3) |
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3.2.9 Shortage of Reserve Power and Expertise |
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84 | (4) |
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88 | (4) |
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3.2.11 We Can't Work under These Conditions! |
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92 | (2) |
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3.2.12 Inquiring Minds Want to Know |
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94 | (2) |
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3.2.13 The Cable Tests Keep Failing |
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96 | (2) |
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3.2.14 The Lights Are on But Nobody's Home |
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98 | (9) |
| 4 Urban Crisis Management in Auckland: Thematic Analysis |
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107 | (52) |
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107 | (3) |
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110 | (3) |
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4.3 Leadership and Group Dynamics |
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113 | (4) |
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4.4 Organizational Cooperation and Conflict |
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117 | (3) |
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4.5 Crisis Communication and Mass Media |
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120 | (6) |
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4.6 Intelligence Gathering and Information Processing |
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126 | (2) |
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128 | (4) |
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4.8 Symbolic Politics versus Technical-Managerial Logic |
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132 | (2) |
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4.9 Experts and Decision Makers |
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134 | (4) |
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4.10 Crisis Management in an Urban Setting |
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138 | (5) |
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4.11 Sequencing and Synchronicity |
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143 | (2) |
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145 | (14) |
| 5 Lessons for Crisis Managers |
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159 | (14) |
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5.1 Expect the Unexpected |
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159 | (1) |
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5.2 Face the Worst Case Scenario |
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160 | (1) |
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5.3 Take Care of Yourself and Your People |
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161 | (1) |
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5.4 Governments Can Be Victims; Victims Can Be Crisis Copers |
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161 | (2) |
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5.5 Take "Political" Responsibility Sensibly |
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163 | (1) |
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5.6 Don't Lose Sight of the Long-Term Picture |
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164 | (1) |
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5.7 Balance Symbolic and Operational Concerns |
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164 | (2) |
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5.8 Beware of Credibility Traps |
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166 | (1) |
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5.9 Make Sure Your Message is Getting Out |
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167 | (1) |
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5.10 Try to Work with the Media |
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168 | (2) |
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170 | (3) |
| Appendix: Chronology of Events |
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173 | (6) |
| Bibliography |
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179 | (22) |
| Index |
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201 | |